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Bottomly: "Fair Value" Test in Public Utility Rate Regulation

NOTES
THE "FAIR VALUE" TEST IN MONTANA PUBLIC UTILITY
RATE REGULATION
Certain enterprises are so intimately bound up with the public welfare, so affected with a public interest, that they became quasi-public enterprises. Chief among these are the utilities. They are granted by government the security of an assured market, freedom from competition and
even the right of eminent domain, but in turn this unique type of business
is subject to restraint. While the ordinary enterprise is entitled to seek
maximum profits, the public utility may not. Its special status obliges it
to limit its profit to that which is fair and reasonable.
In the nineteenth century a feeling grew that some supervisory body
with power to create and enforce its own rules was needed to control the
operation of public utilities. Illinois finally led the way by creating the
first mandatory commission in 1871 to govern and establish maximum rates
for railroads and warehouses. The constitutionality of such a rate-making
body was upheld in 1876 in Munn v. Illinois.' Thereafter the federal government and all of the states undertook similarly to delegate rate-making
responsibility to administrative agencies, most often called a "Public Service Commission." Though this was admittedly a delegation of legislative
power, the permissibility of such an arrangement was upheld by the
Supreme Court Four years after the Munn decision the Supreme Court
established the principle that a public utility is entitled to earn a reasonable
return from its property dedicated to public use, and that the fixing by a
state of unreasonable rates for a utility amounted to the taking of property
without due process of law.3 However, within this constitutional framework the action of the rate-making agency is controlled by the standards
set up in the statute through which it received its delegation of authority.4
THE MONTANA STATUTES AND THE FAIR VALUE TEST
The Montana Public Service Commission was established in 1921 to
carry out the following public policy: "Every public utility is required
to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities. The charge made by
any public utility . . .shall be reasonable and just, and every unjust and

unreasonable charge is prohibited and declared unlawful."' In carrying
out its duty of ascertaining the reasonableness of rates the Commission is
provided with a statutory guide, which provides in part: "The commission
may, in its discretion, investigate and ascertain the value of the property
194 U.S. 113 (1876).
2
I. at 133. See also Billings Utility Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 62 Mont. 21, 206
Pac. 366 (1921),.
'Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1880).
'Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 88 Mont. 180, 293 Pac. 294
(1930).
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 70-102, 72-101; Great Northern Utilities Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 88 Mont. 180, 293 Pac. 294 (1930). (Hereinafter REviSED
CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.)
OR.C.M. 1947, § 70-105.
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of every public utility actually used and useful for the convenience of
the public. "' It should be noted that the language of the statute is clearly
only permissive, and that reference is made only to "value."
The terms
present value, fair value, prudent investment, originalcast, actual legitimate
cost, and reproduction cost new, terms used frequently in discussing proper
rates, do not appear in it.
At the time these statutes were enacted the constitutional due process
requirement applicable to state rate commission action was set forth by he
United States Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames.! In that case the Court
made the statement that "the basis of all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under
legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it
for the convenience of the public.'" Having thus, in two words, denominated the doctrine which was to dominate all regulatory efforts for the next
forty-six years, the Court then added the statement which was to become
the stumbling block of all efforts to apply it :'
And in order to ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount
and market value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared
with the original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity
of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for
consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and
right in each case. We do not say that there may not be other
matters to be regarded in estimating the value of the property.
What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value
of that which it employs for the public convenience. On the other
hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be
exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the services
rendered by it are reasonably worth.
Out of this dictum, obviously meant only as a partial enumeration of the
many factors to be given "such weight as might be just and right in each
case," subsequently grew the "fair value" doctrine. As developed in later
cases the doctrine came to be associated with and characterized by an
undue emphasis on reproduction cost (at present prices) as the primary
element of value. The other factors set forth in the enumeration in Smyth
v.Anes, though occasionally considered, have been regarded as of minimal
importance.
In spite of the permissive wording of the rate statute," the early Montana cases required the Commission to ascertain present property values.
In one case the Montana Supreme Court said :'
'R.C.M. 1947, § 70-106.
'169
U.S. 446 (1898).
9
Id. at 546 (Emphasis added).
"'Id. at 546-47.
"Notably San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U.S. 739, 757-58 (1899);
San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jaspar, 189 U.S. 439, 442-43 (1903) ; Bluefield Water
Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) ; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 70-106, quoted in text at note 7 supra.
"Great Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 88 Mont. 180, 293 Pac. 294,
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/8
303 (1930) (Emphasis added).
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NOTES

Any order made by the Commission must be just and reasonable.
What is a reasonable charge, or a just and reasonable order, must
depend upon the facts in each case. What a utility is entitled to
demand in order that it may have just compensation is a fair return upon the reasonable value of the property at the time it is
being used for the public.
And in Tobacco River Power v. Public Service Commission it stated: '
" [W]e believe that section 3884, infra, [now R.C.M. 1947, section 70-106]
indicates that present fair value of the utility should be ascertained for the
purposes of rate making." In support of both decisions the court cited the
Minnesota Rate Cases and Smyth v. Ames.'
It is not questioned that the Supreme Court of Montana made a correct interpretation of the law as it then stood. Regardless of any statutory
enactment in this state, by reason of the decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Smyth v. Ames the constitutional interpretation of
"reasonable and just" rates required that the rates be established on the
basis of the "fair value" of the property of the utility. That this was the
substantive constitutional requirement at that time is demonstrated by the
holding of the United States Supreme Court in Denver Union Stock Yard
Company v. United States, where the Court ruled :'
[A]s of right safeguarded by ...the Fifth Amendment, appellant is entitled to rates, not per se excessive and extortionate, sufficient to yield a reasonable rate of return upon the value of the
property used, at the time it is being used, to render the services.
However, even at the time of that emphatic statement of the rule, the process of change had started.
OBJECTIONS TO THE FAIR VALUE AND REPRODUCTION
COST CONCEPTS
The concept of "fair value" as a rate base was unsound even at the
time of its inception. Smyth v. Ames was based on an erroneous analogy
to eminent domain. It was there reasoned that since indemnification for
the full value of property was required when it was condemned by the
state, the preservation of the full value of private property devoted to
public services was required when its use was regulated by the state. Any
impingement upon that value was regarded as a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the due process clause.' The fallacy
in the analogy is apparent. Any limitation upon earnings--the essence of
rate regulation-necessarily affects the value of the going concern.' In
'"109 Mont. 521, 528, 98 P.2d 886, 889 (1940) (Emphasis added).
15230 U.S. 352 (1913).
1169 U.S.466 (1898).
"304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938).

"5 In addition to Smyth v. Ames, supra note 8, see West v. Chesapeak & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662, 671 (1935). See also Tobacco River Power Co., v. Public
Service Comm'n, 109 Mont. 521, 98 P.2d 886 (1941).
"Federal Power Comm'n, v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 602-604 (1942).
See also Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33 HARV. L. REV. 902, 1031
(1921) ; Richberg, Value by Judicial Fiat, 40 HARV. L. RV. 567 (1927) ; Hale, Does

the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk, 55 HAuv.L. REv. 1116 (1942); Hale, The

FairValue Merry-Go-Round, 33 IL. L. Rav. 517 (1939) ; 2 BoBSIGT, VALUATION
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FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company,' (treated
fully below) the United States Supreme Court recognized this: "The
of the matter is that rates cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value'
the value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever
may be anticipated."

more
heart
when
rates

The original need for a "fair value" rate base no longer exists. In
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission' Justice
Brandeis said:
The adoption of present value of the utility's property, as the rate
base, was urged in 1893, on behalf of the community; and it was
adopted by the courts, largely, as a protection against inflated
claims based on what were then deemed inflated prices of the
past [citing authority].... Those were the days before state legislation prohibited the issue of public utility securities without
authorization from state officials; before accounting was prescribed
and supervised; when outstanding bonds and stocks were hardly
an indication of the amount of capital embarked in the enterprise;
when -lepreciation accounts were unknown; and when book values,
or property accounts, furnished no trustworthy evidence either of
cost or of real value. Estimates of reproduction cost were then
offered, largely as a means, either of supplying lacks in the proofs
of actual cost and investment, or of testing the credibility of evidence adduced, or of showing that the cost of installation had been
wasteful.
Further, fair value as a rate base is wholly indefinite and uncertain.
In the forty-six years Smyth v. Ames ruled the question, the Supreme Court
never succeeded in defining the value required by its decisions.' In criticizing the rule Judge Learned Hand said: "Merely to leave the question with
a caution that several elements are to be considered is to abandon any effort
to solve it. " And in the same vein Justice Brandeis stated :"
Obviously, "value," cannot be a composite of all these elements.
Nor can it be arrived at on all these bases. They are very different; and must, when applied in a particular case, lead to widely
different results ....

The result, inherent in the rule itself, is arbi-

trary action, on the part of the rate regulating body.
Consideration of reproduction cost (which is the primary basis of "fair
value") renders the "fair value" rate base unworkable. The great delay
and expense involved in eliciting reproduction cost evidence is notorious.
The concurring opinion in FederalPower Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. states :'

21320 U.S. 591,601 (1944).
21262 U.S. 276, 298-99 (1923).
22

BONBRIGHT, VALUATION

OF PROPERTY 1119

(1937).

2Consolidated Gas Co. v. Newton, 267 Fed. 231, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
'Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 295-97
(1923). See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S.
575, 604-05; 2

BONBRIGHT, VALUATION

OF PROPERTY

1104 n.57 (1937).
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1105

-315 U.S. 575, 605 (1942). See also 2 BONBRIGHT,
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/8
(1937) ; Driscoll v, Edison Co., 307 U.S. 104 (1939).
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The havoc raised by insistence on reproduction cost is now a matter
of historical record. Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Southwestern
Bell Telephone case demonstrated how the rule of Smyth v. Ames
has seriously impaired the power of rate-regulation and how the
'fair value' rule has proved to be unworkable by reason of the
time required to make the valuations, the heavy expense involved,
and the unreliability of the results obtained.
In addition, a rate base dependent upon reproduction cost estimates
lacks stability and certainty because of the continually fluctuating nature
of those costs."
And finally, the "fair value" rate base lacks any real significance in
fixing just and reasonable rates. This is apparent from the fact that
utilities have thrived and have been willing, anxious, and able to render
service for long periods under rates which would be "confiscatory" under
the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. As Bonbright has said: "In short, it was
good business to submit to confiscation!"' This anomaly is explainable
in part, at least, from the fact that a large part of utility properties were
and are purchased with the proceeds of long term bonds issued at low
interest rates. In such a situation to follow a reproduction-cost-new rate
base, especially in times of inflation, is to take no cognizance of the immense resulting windfall to stockholders arising from the fact that the interest obligation on the bonds remains static.
Such undue returns to
equity investors, capitalizing on "fair value" rate bases, undoubtedly contributed to the wild speculation in utility securities and the holding company debacles of the late 1920's.
Eventually the logic of these arguments began to have some effect on
the thinking of the courts.
THE RETREAT FROM SMYTH V. AMES
In at least four decisions since 1930 the United States Supreme Court
indicated that it was more concerned with the results under the rates prescribed than it was with the method used by the commission in fixing rates.'
In a fifth case, Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company,' the Supreme Court indicated just how much it had changed its
views on this question. The Hope case involved the Federal Natural Gas
Act which directs the Federal Power Commission to determine "just and
reasonable" rates,' and authorizes it to "investigate and ascertain the

'Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 306-07
(1923).
2'2 BONBIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 1152 (1937).
"See a graphic discussion of this situation in Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion
in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 305
(1923).

29Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 289 U.S. 287,
304, 314 (1933) ; Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934)
Dayton Power & Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290 (1934);
Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 311 U.S. 575, 587 (1942).
0320 U.S. 591 (1944).
8152 Stat.
822, 823 (1938),at 15
Published
by ScholarWorks
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actual legitimate cost .. . and, when found necessary for rate-making purposes, other facts which bear on the determination of such cost or depreciation and the fair value of such property."'
An original cost rate base
figure had been used by the Commission, although it had permitted the
introduction by the company of reproduction cost evidence. The Court of
Appeals reversed and held it to be "clear that the statute contemplates
that the [rate] base should be determined in accordance with existing legal
rules,' i.e., the "fair value" doctrine of Smyth v. Ames. In reversing the
Court of Appeals the Supreme Court held that Congress had not required
the use of any particular formula. The Court said, in part: "Rates which
enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the, risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned invalid, even though they might
produce only a meager return on the so-called 'fair value' rate base.'
Thus the forty-six year epic ended.
The Hope case was soon followed by Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v.
Federal Power Commission and PanhandleEastern Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Commissione where the Court reaffirmed its acceptance of
actual legitimate costs and reasserted that the Federal Natural Gas Act is
concerned only with the end results of rate orders when viewed in their
entirety.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the United States Supreme
Court is now committed to the view that there is no constitutional requirement that utii'ties be permitted to earn a "fair return" on the "fair
value" of the property devoted to public use. It should be clear that the
Hope decision has bearing on state rate orders as well as federal rate
orders, for the requirements of due process are similar for each. As the
Court reiterated in Hope,' quoting its earlier decision of Federal Power
Commission v 'Tatural Gas Pipeline Co.,' "the 'authority of Congress to
regulate the prices of commodities in interstate commerce is at least as great
under the Fifth Amendment as is that of the States under the Fourteenth
to regulate the prices of commodities in intrastate commerce.' " Indeed
the Hope case has had a far reaching effect on state determinations of this
matter as indicated by the following summary of the cases as of 1954 :'
The evidence discloses that of the forty-three states [including
the District of Columbia) included in this survey, four use original
cost or prudent investment as the rate base and did so prior to the
Hope case ;'0 nine follow fair value according to its traditional
meaning ;' eight have adopted original cost as the measure of fair
value ;' and nineteen have explicity changed from fair value to
-52 Stat 824 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 717e (1958).
81134 F.2d 287, 295 (4th Cir. 1943).
'320 U.S. 591, 605 (1944).
-324 U.S. 581, 604 (1945).
"324 U.S. 635, 649 (1945).
-320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
"315 U.S. 575, 582 (1942).

'*Rose, The Hope Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States, 54 COLUM. L. Rav.
188,212 (1954).
"0 Cal., Mass., Wis., and possibly Wash.
"Ill, Ind., Mich., Mont, N.D., Ohio, Pa., and probably S.D. and N.M.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/8
'2Ga., Kan., Ky., Md., Minn., N.J., R.T, and W, Va.
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original cost or prudent investment.43 Thus the disintegration of
the fair value formula has been rapidly accelerated by the Hope
decision. Of all the predictions commonly made at the time of the
decision, the one anticipating the decline of reproduction cost and
fair value in rate-making has proved most accurate.
MONTANA RATE REGULATION THEORY
The Montana Public Service Commission has not chosen to forsake the
fair value theory with its heavy emphasis on a reproduction cost rate base.
The primary responsibility for any forward step in this regard is with the
Commission, not the courts, for it is the Commission that must first act
pursuant to direct legislative authority; then, upon review, recognizing
that the fixing of rates is a legislative function, the courts should make
allowance for Commission expertise in such matters.
The Montana Supreme Court, exercising its review function, has come
forth with some alarming constructions of the Montana regulatory statutes.
In State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Service Commission" the Commission had
granted an increase in rates based on the average fair value of the company's property devoted to intrastate service for the year of the order,
1953. The protestant contended, as it had once before," that the Hope
Natural Gas case had discredited the fair value doctrine and thus changed
the rule in Montana. The court affirmed the Commission's order and thus
reached the proper result, since the order was based on substantial evidence and under the broad wording of the statutes the Commission seems
free to choose any type of rate base. But the opinion is replete with unfounded constructions of the regulatory statutes.
After setting forth Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, section 70-106,'
the court went on to say :" "The language of the statute is clear that the
Commission shall determine 'the value of the property of every public
utility actually used and useful for the convenience of the public.' " A little further on is this statement:" "While our statute does not establish
a formula for arriving at fair value, it does require such value to be found
and used as the base in fixing rates." And still further :" "The trend,
of all judicial utterances examined even in states in which the statute does
vot require value to -be considered as a factor as Montana does, is to permit
the commissions to exercise their discretion in establishing a proper rate
base ..... " How or why the imperative shall is read into the permissive may
"Ala., Ark., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Idaho, La., Me., Mo.,, N.H., N.C., N.Y., Okla.,
Ore., Utah, Vt., Va., and Wyo. In Ariz., Nev. and Tenn. substantial evidence of
policy is lacking.
"'131Mont. 272, 309 P.2d 1035 (1957).
"State em rel. Olsen v. Public Service Comm'n, 131 Mont. 104, 308 P.2d 633 (1957).
""70-106. Power of commission to ascertain property values. The commission may,
in its discretion, investigate and ascertain the value of the property of every public
utility actually used and useful for the convenience of the public. In making such
investigation the commission may avail itself of all information contained in the
assessment rolls of various counties, and the public records of the various branches
of the state government, or any other information obtainable, and the commission
may at any time of its own initiative make a revaluation of such property."
"131 Mont. at 276, 309 P.2d at 1038 (Boldface emphasis added).
"Id. at 278, 309 P.2d at 1039 (Emphasis added).
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by(Emphasis
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of the statute is never explained by the court. It is submitted first that
such a construction can only lead to confusion, and second, that the court
should at least treat the matter with consistency. Only two pages later in
answer to the contention of the protestant that Revised Codes of Montana,
1947, section 70-106, makes it incumbent upon the commission to make an
independent investigation of its own before increasing rates, the court stated
that the statute was permissive only.' To state that in this instance the
court appears to be engaged in judicial legislation is to state the obvious.
The only reference in the decision to the Hope case is that it has no
effect on the law in Montana.' It seems clear that the court, even if it did
not expressly so state, decided the case on the basis of the precedent of the
Tobacco River decision? Yet no attempt was made by the court to face
up to the issue raised by the fact that the Supreme Court in Hope had
finally abrogated the Sm yth v. Ames requirement of fair value, which if
not openly acknowledged, certainly supplied the compelling rationale of
the Tobacco River decision.
Compare with this Montana rationale the position of the Supreme Court
of Utah when faced with a nearly identical problem. The Utah rate regulation statute provides that the rates established by the commission shall be
just and reasonable and that the commission "shall have the power to ascertain the value of the property of every public utility. "' In Utah Power
& Light Co. v. Public Service Commission' the Utah Commission had ordered a rate decrease. The company appealed directly to the Utah Supreme
Court contending that it was entitled to a reasonable return on the "fair
value" of its property, and that the commission could not determine a rate
base founded on cost. The company orginally based its claim for "fair
value" on both a constitutional and a statutory right, but between the time
of its original brief and its reply brief the Supreme Court decided the Hope
Natural Gas case, and the company dropped its constitutional argument,
conceding that Hope had destroyed any claim for such relief. It insisted
instead on its statutory right to "fair value." In response to this claim the
court held that the Utah statute could not be construed as a mandate requiring the commission to act on a value rate base. For sheer clarity and
lucidity the Utah opinion best illustrates the proper approach to this problem -'
The removal of the constitutional barrier erected by Smyth v.
Ames unleashed the power of the Commission and permitted it to
expand into fields previously restricted by earlier court decisions.

"Id.at 281, 309 P.2d at 1041.

"The immediately prior decision, State ex reZ. Olsen v. Public Service Comm'n, 131
Mont. 104, 308 P.2d 633 (1957), though reaching the same result as the case presently being considered, entered into a more thorough examination of the effect of the
Hope decision on the merits and demerits of the fair value theory, though concluding: "This court has held that the value of the property means the present fair
value and that reproduction cost new less depreciation is an important factor in
determining the value." :(Citing Tobacco River Power Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 109 Mont. 521, 98 P.2d 886 (1940).
'109 Mont. 521, 98 P.2d 886 (1940).
"'UTAH Con ANN. §§ 54-4-1, -21 (1953).

"107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542 (1944).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol22/iss1/8
6152 P.2d at 558.
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At the time of Smyth v. Ames a rate could not be just and reasonable in the constitutional sense unless it permitted a fair return
on fair value.

This concept has ...

been overruled.

It would be

contrary to common sense to hold that the legislature meant "just
and reasonable" only as defined by the courts at the time of Smyth
v. Ames and to hold that the legislature would, in order to authorize the Commission to use prudent investment, be required to reenact the statute saying that it mean "just and reasonable" as that
term is construed today. To the contrary, it must be assumed
that the legislature contemplated that the concept of that which
is "just and reasonable" might change with social trends. Possibly that is why the legislature did not prescribe a definite formula to be applied to every case without variation. The term
"just and reasonable" is not an absolute. The legislature need
not amend the statute to permit the Commission to apply the
present judicial interpretation of what is "just and reasonable."
It could be argued in Montana, as it was in Utah, that in 1921 when
the legislature passed the Public Service Laws, they intended to embody
into those laws the meaning expressed in Smyth v. Ames. It could be
argued that the legislature, in its selection of the word value deliberately
designed to freeze into the statute law of this state the rate base then currently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court. It therefore becomes important to ascertain the intent of the legislature at the time it enacted this statute. To deduce a deliberate legislative design to compel consideration of reproduction cost estimates in fixing the rates of utilities attributes to the astuteness and mental processes of the draftsmen more than
is warranted. First, there is nothing in the legislative history which would
indicate that the decision in anyway affected the ideas of the draftsmen of
this statute.' They did not copy the key term of the Smyth v. Ames decision, i.e., "fair value." Second, they made no effort whatever to depict
"value" in a fluctuating present sale or exchange context. They did not
precede it with the word "reproduction," nor follow it with any qualifying
phrase such as "at the time it is being used for the public." And third,
there is no express mandate that the Commission value the property at all.
The deliberate selection of words which connote permission strongly indicates that the legislature intended only to place a guide at the disposal of
the Commission. The only limitation appended to the delegation of power
contained in these statutes is that the rates established by the Commission
must be "just and reasonable."
With the passing of the "fair value" doctrine from the scene the full
broad scope of the legislation becomes free for application. It is submitted
that should the Public Service Commission in the future desire to abandon
completely the discredited reproduction-cost-new rate base it should do so
without hesitation. At such time the Montana Supreme Court would then
be faced squarely with the proposition decided by the Utah Court above,
whose lucid analysis is recommended for consideration.
JAMES V. BOTTOMLY
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